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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, the number of female Chief Executive Officers (CEO’s) at large firm’s has 
increased to the point that it is possible to statistically compare the performance and management 
characteristics of firms managed by CEO’s of different genders.  This paper is an exploratory 
study that examines the relationship between CEO gender and the performance and management 
of publicly traded firms.  We use a large dataset of annual Forbes CEO data, combined with 
Compustat data, covering the time period of 1997 to 2006.  Our results show that CEO gender is 
related to a number of factors including inside ownership and return on assets.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
hroughout history, males have predominantly occupied the largest United States firm’s CEO (Chief 
Executive Officer) positions.  More recently, females have breached this glass ceiling and 
increasingly take on CEO responsibilities.  This opens the door to examine questions about how 
gender affects CEO management style, firm performance and how much investors will pay to purchase the firm.   
Sufficient data is now available to conduct meaningful statistical analysis to answer these questions.  Nevertheless, 
little academic research exists on the performance of CEO’s in the largest United States firms as it relates to CEO 
gender. 
 
This exploratory study examines the extent that CEO gender explains firm management and market 
performance indicators.  We use data from the annual Forbes Compensation List supplemented with data from 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat.  The data covers the time period 1997-2006.  The results show that CEO gender 
explains several important firm management variables. Female CEO’s either operate their firms differently, or 
alternatively are hired to manage firms having certain characteristics.  The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows.  In the next section, we examine the relevant literature.  Next, we discuss the data and methodology used in 
the paper.  The results of statistical tests follow.  The paper closes with some concluding comments. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found that CEO demographics affect firm performance.  They show that time 
in position, years with the firm, educational level, and functional background impact firm performance. Barker and 
Mueller (2002) examined how CEO background relates to R&D spending.  They found, significant R&D spending 
increases at firms where the CEO earned an advanced science degree.  Gabaix and Landier (2008) found small 
differences in CEO talent justify large pay differences.  Their findings indicate that increases in CEO pay from 1980 
through 2003 can be fully attributed to increases in market capitalization of large companies.  Hermalin (2005) 
argues that improved corporate governance explains CEO compensation increases.  Higher pay compensates for the 
increased chance of being fired. 
T 
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Jalbert, Rao, and Jalbert (2002) identify preferred educational backgrounds for selection as CEO of a major 
corporation.  They find that CEOs without a college degree earn significantly more than those with a college degree.  
They find little evidence that the school attended affects CEO compensation.  Jalbert, Jalbert and Perrina (2004), 
examined the specific degrees earned by CEOs as it relates to the salary earned as CEO.  The results indicate the 
total compensation individuals earn as CEO depends upon the degrees the individual holds.  They found those with 
different degrees were with the firm for differing numbers of years, started working for the firm and became CEO at 
different ages, and were with the firm for varying amounts of time prior to becoming CEO. 
 
Gottesman and Morey (2006) find firms with CEOs from more prestigious schools do not outperform other 
CEOs. Firms managed by CEOs with MBA or law degrees do not outperform firms with CEOs without a graduate 
degree.  However, their results indicate that compensation is somewhat higher for CEOs who attend more 
prestigious schools. Palia (2000) examined how a CEO’s educational background impacts the type of firms they 
manage.  He compared the performance of individuals based on the prestige of the university where they earned 
their undergraduate and graduate degrees.  The results indicate managers with lower quality educational 
backgrounds manage firms in regulated industries and those with higher quality educational backgrounds manage 
firms in unregulated industries.   
 
Palia and Ravid (2002) found that founders are less responsive to performance incentives and that founder 
run firms are more profitable.  However, they found that firms led by family members of the original founders have 
lower market values.  Fahlenbrach (2009) found that firms managed by a founder invest more in R&D, have higher 
capital expenditures and made more focused mergers and acquisitions.  He also found that investing in founder 
managed firms produced a 4.4% annual abnormal return.  Jalbert and Jalbert (2005) found that founders earn higher 
compensation than their non-founder counterparts.  Moreover the authors found significant differences between 
founders and non-founders in the ages when CEOs earned their degrees, age at which they started working for the 
company and age at which they become CEO.  Founders tend to finish their degrees prior to entering the work force, 
while non-founders tend to enter the workforce prior to earning their degree. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Since 1973, Forbes magazine has published an annual list containing information about the CEO’s of large 
United States companies.  The Forbes list includes information about compensation and other variables for up to 800 
CEOs each year.  Forbes reduced the number of firms included in the analysis from 800 to 500 in 2002.  Forbes 
selects firms for inclusion in the list based on firm size.  This study is based on the Forbes Compensation List.  
Forbes provided the authors with some data in electronic format.   Others were obtained from lists presented on the 
Forbes website.  The Data covers a ten year period 1997-2006 including 6,305 annual firm observations.  Each firm 
in the Forbes list was matched with its corresponding ticker symbol.  Next, supplemental financial data on each firm 
were obtained from Standard and Poor’s Compustat. 
 
The primary variable of interest in the study was the CEO gender.   Each CEO name in the database was 
analyzed to determine if the CEO was male or female.  The variable GENDER equals one if the CEO is female and 
zero if the CEO is male.  For those observations where the gender was not obvious based on the individual’s name, 
an internet search was conducted to identify gender.  The data includes 77 observations with a Female CEO and 
6,228 observations with a male CEO.  Thus, females account for 1.22 percent of the total CEO population.  Jalbert, 
Furumo and Jalbert (2011) find that female CEO’s earn higher compensation than male CEO’s.  However, they find  
no evidence to suggest that firms managed by female CEO’s outperform other firms.    
 
Of further interest is the extent to which attending an Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of 
Business AACSB accredited school impacts the dependent variables.  To examine this issue, we identify 
observations where the CEO earned either an undergraduate or a graduate degree from an AACSB accredited 
school.  Accreditation information from the AACSB website permitted us to make this determination.  The dummy 
variable, AACSB, equals one if the individual earned a degree from an AACSB accredited school and zero 
otherwise.  The data includes 5,272 observations where the CEO earned either a graduate degree or an 
undergraduate degree from an AACSB accredited school and 1,033 observations where neither an undergraduate or 
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graduate degree was earned from an AACSB accredited school.  Jalbert, Jalbert and Furumo (2011) find that firms 
with CEO’s from AACSB accredited schools tend to underperform those with CEO’s from other schools. 
 
We include four additional demographic variables related to the CEO.  We include a dummy variable 
indicating if the CEO is the founder of the company.  The variable Founder equals 1 if the current CEO is the firm 
founder.  The variable equals zero if the current CEO is not the founder of the company.  We do not control for the 
effects of a founding CEO that leaves the company, then returns at a later time.  Years with the company indicates 
the number of years the individual has worked for the firm.  Years as CEO, indicates the number of years the 
individual has served as the firm’s CEO.  Total Compensation is the total remuneration the CEO receives for his or 
her services to the firm.  Total compensation, TC, as reported by Forbes magazine, measures the reward the CEO 
receives for all activities performed by the firm.  This variable includes salary, bonus, stock compensation and other 
compensation. Murphy (2003) and Murphy and Hall (2002) document the importance of differentiating between 
compensation components.  However, this analysis is limited to a single measure of compensation.   
 
To identify differences in performance by CEO’s, we examine Return on Assets, Return on Equity and 
Return on Investment.  These variables indicate how effectively the CEO utilizes the assets, equity and investments 
in the firm.  To control for the well-known size effect we include the total assets of the firm.  Related to total assets 
is the sales growth of the firm.  Sales growth measures how fast sales are increasing thereby providing the 
opportunity to increase the asset base and profits.  We also incorporate Free Cash Flows in the model to reflect the 
ability of the firm to finance profitable projects. 
 
CEOs have exclusive or significant control over capital structure and dividend policy which indicate how 
the firm's assets are financed.  Readers interested in the capital structure decision are referred to Modigliani and 
Miller (1958); Modigliani and Miller (1963); Miller (1977); DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); and Jalbert (2002).  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that in an idealized world, dividends do not affect firm value.  However, other 
authors find that dividends have important roles within the firm (Easterbrook, 1984; and  Bhattacharyya, Mawani 
and Morrill, 2008a and 2008b). The dividend payout ratio of the firm, PAYOUT, and debt to assets ratio, Debt-to-
Assets, are incorporated into the analysis to capture managerial effects. 
 
Three variables measure the shareholder perceptions.  Institutional ownership and Inside Ownership 
measure the willingness of certain groups to purchase the firm’s stock.  Insider and Institutional owners commonly 
have better information than other investors.  Higher levels of ownership by these individuals indicate they have a 
positive perception of the firm’s prospects.  Price to book measures the amount that investors are willing to pay for 
the net assets of the firm.  Higher price to book ratios indicate that stockholders are willing to pay more for one 
dollar of net assets. 
 
It is well established that firms in different industries are operated and valued differently.  To control for 
these effects we include an industry indicator variable, Global Industry Classification Standard, GICS.   We also 
include a variable year.  The year variable indicates the year for which the observation relates, ranging from 1997-
2006.  The year variable controls for changing relationships between the independent and dependent variables across 
time. 
 
Some descriptive statistics of seventeen variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 1.  As 
show in Table 1, the variables occur in the dataset with differing frequency.  Inside ownership information is 
included for 4,619 observations.  Data on CEO Gender and if the CEO founded the firm is available for all 6305 
observations in the dataset. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
ROE 5,576 13.02 5,625 -6,164 153.30 
ROA 5,739 4.10 132.78 -492.11 14.47 
ROI 5,678 8.38 905.71 -1,173 34.73 
Gender 6,305 0.01221 1 0.00 0.1098 
Total Assets 5,740 32,669 1,884,318 0.1810 104,760 
Inside Ownership 4,619 11.04 189.13 0.00 2.16 
Institutional Ownership 4,658 75.099 140.62 0.00 140.62 
Payout 5,699 27.08 30,516 -34,928 681.69 
Free Cash Flow 4,942 374.89 77,094 -50,115 3,099 
Debt to Assets 5,723 26.19 691.58 0 22.61 
Sales Growth 5,730 33.83 54,280 -100 726.15 
Total Compensation 6,200 8,225 706,077 0.00 24,047 
Price to Book 4,895 6.239 5332 -1,638 99.571 
Price to Earnings 5,085 38.10 6,344 0.2220 177.36 
Founder 6,305 0.090 1 0.00 0.2863 
Years with Company 6,237 19.672 66 0.00 12.375 
Years as CEO 6,051 7.816 60 .050 7.903 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The empirical analysis begins by completing a series of single regressions.  Equation 1 shows the estimated 
model: 
 
                                  .   (1) 
 
As noted earlier, Gender is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a female CEO and zero for a male CEO.  Table 2 
shows the results of this regression incorporating several dependent variables.  The results show that CEO gender 
has significant explanatory power for four variables.  CEO gender explains Return on Investment, ROI, but does not 
explain Return on Assets, ROA, or Return on Equity, ROE.  Gender explains the Price to Earnings Ratio, PE, but it 
does not explain the Price to Book ratio, PB.  The positive coefficient on the PE variable indicates that investors are 
willing to pay more to acquire firms that are managed by a female.   Gender explains the Debt Ratio as well as the 
industry.  The results suggest that women serve as CEOs in some industries more often than others.  Moreover, 
female CEO’s finance their firms differently than male CEO’s.  In each regression the R2 statistic is low.  The 
highest R2 occurs for the PE ratio at 0.0065.   
 
Table 2:  Regressions on Gender 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Observations Intercept Coefficient T-Statistic R2 
ROA Gender 5,739 4.110 -0.8036 -0.480 0.0000 
ROI Gender 5,678   -2.23** 0.0009 
ROE Gender 5,576 13.079 -5.358 -0.280 0.0000 
Price to Earnings Gender 5,085 36.465 126.230 5.760*** 0.0065 
Sales Growth Gender 5,730 33.495 24.718 0.30 0.0000 
Price to Book Gender 4,895 6.105 9.356 0.780 0.0001 
Inside Ownership Gender 4,619 11.0223 1.4857 0.520 0.0001 
Institutional Ownership Gender 4,658 75.090 0.78869 0.280 0.0000 
Free Cash Flow Gender 4,924 375.50 -45.343 -0.120 0.0000 
CEO Compensation Gender 6,200 8,253 -2,281 -0.820 0.0001 
Debt to Assets Gender 5,723 26.046 10.864 4.190*** 0.0031 
Payout Ratio Gender 5,699 27.121 -3.413 -0.040 0.0000 
Total Assets Gender 5,740 32,842 -12,953 -1.080 0.0002 
GICS Gender 6,016 32.628 6.073 4.220*** 0.0029 
This table shows the results of regressions on gender.  The estimated equations is:                                    .  
Gender is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a female CEO and zero for a male CEO. 
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The analysis continues by incorporating control variables into the analysis.  We run multiple regressions as 
specified in Equation 2. 
 
                                                      (2) 
 
Control Variablet is a vector of control variables that may affect the impact of gender on the dependent variable.  
The other parameters in the model are as defined earlier.  Table 3 shows the regression results for five dependent 
variables.  The first column shows the regression results when PE is the dependent variable.  The results show that 
Gender significantly explains the Price to Earnings ratio, at the one percent level of significance, after considering 
the effects of sixteen control variables. The positive coefficient on Gender indicates that firms managed by females 
have higher price to earnings ratios.  This implies that investors pay more for firms that are managed by females.  
Other significant variables include price to book ratio, Debt to Assets, Return on Assets, Payout, sales growth, years 
with the company and the observation year.  The R2 and adjusted R2 for this regression equal 0.1066 and 0.1013 
respectively.  Variance inflation factors less than ten indicate multicollinearity is not an issue in a regression.  The 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable in this regression is less than 1.76.   
 
The second column shows the regression results for the dependent variable Return on Investment, ROI.  
Gender is significant in the regression at the one percent level.  The positive coefficient on gender indicates that 
female CEO’s produce more ROI, for their investors than male CEO’s.  Other significant variables include the price 
to book ratio, debt to assets, free cash flow, sales growth, inside ownership, institutional ownership, founder, total 
compensation, years as CEO and years with the company.  Variance Inflation factors are each less than 1.70. 
 
The third column shows the regression results when Return on Assets is the dependent variable.  Again, 
gender is significant with a positive coefficient indicating that female CEOs produce higher return on assets.  The 
control variables generally follow a similar pattern of significance as the ROI regressions.  The exceptions are 
Industry, Total Assets, and year which are significant in the ROA regression, but not the ROI regression.  Founder 
and years as CEO are significant in the ROI regression but not in the ROA regression.  The regression produces an 
R2 of 0.1606 and an adjusted R2 of 0.1563.  The VIF is less than 1.70 for each variable. 
 
The Sales Growth regression results presented in the fourth column of Table 3 shows a positive and 
significant Gender coefficient.   The interpretation is that firms managed by females have higher Sales Growth than 
other firms.  Other significant variables in this regression include price to book, debt to assets, ROA, Inside 
Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Founder, Total Compensation, Years as CEO, Years with the Company and 
Year.  The regression has a R2 of 0.1337 and an adjusted R2 of 12.93.  The VIF is less than 1.69 for each variable. 
 
The final column in Table 3 shows the regression results for the dependent variable Institutional 
Ownership.  Gender produces a negative and significant coefficient at the ten percent level.  Industry is also 
significant indicating that different industries have differing levels of institutional ownership.  Total assets, has a 
negative and significant coefficient indicating that smaller firms in the sample have more institutional ownership.  
Other significant variables include Free Cash Flow, ROA, Sales Growth, Inside Ownership, Years as CEO, Years 
with the company and AACSB accreditation.  Interestingly, AACSB accreditation has a negative coefficient, 
indicating that institutional ownership is higher among firms with CEO’s from universities that are not accredited.  
The R2 for this regression is 0.2211 and the adjusted R2 is 0.2171.  The VIF is less than 1.69 for each variable. 
 
Next, we conduct stepwise regressions to determine which variables enter into the models significantly.  
Equation 2 above is estimated.  Variables with a p-value less than 0.20 were allowed to enter into the model.  To 
remain in the model the variable’s p-value must be below 0.10.  The results are presented in Table 4.  The first 
figure in each cell is the parameter estimate.  The second figure in each cell is the F-value.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
The results in Table 4 show that nine variables are significant in explaining the Price to Earnings ratio.  Six 
variables are significant at the 1 percent level, two at the 5 percent level and one at the 10 percent level.  Gender, 
with a coefficient of 163.52, is significant at the one percent level.  The positive sign on Gender implies that 
investors pay a higher price to earnings ratio for firms managed by women.  The positive coefficient on AACSB 
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indicates that firms with managers from an AACSB accredited school have a higher price to earnings ratio than 
other firms.  The R2 for the regression is 0.1052.  
 
The regressions on ROI indicate nine significant explanatory variables.  Gender, along with three other 
variables is significant at the one percent level.  Gender has a coefficient of 17.30.  CEO compensation and the 
number of years the CEO has been with the firm are both positive and significant.  This indicates that firms with 
higher ROI pay their managers better, and the CEO remains with the company for longer periods of time.  The R2 
for the regression is 0.031 indicating that while a number of variables explain ROI, the overall explanatory power of 
this regression is low.   
 
Table 3:  Regression Analysis 
Variable Price to Earnings ROI ROA Sales Growth 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Observations 2,877 3,167 3,180 3,180 3,180 
Intercept 7,421 -636.77 -383.76 3,645 64.37 
Gender 159.57 
6.04*** 
17.1854 
3.84*** 
5.9107 
4.09*** 
26.289 
2.72*** 
-4.2596 
-1.81* 
GICS 0.3289 
1.22 
-0.0158 
-0.35 
-0.0286 
-1.96** 
0.1434 
1.47 
-0.31953 
-13.83*** 
Price to Book 0.08706 
2.03* 
0.0129 
1.72* 
0.00618 
2.54*** 
0.0651 
4.02*** 
-0.0019 
-0.47 
Total Assets -0.00005 
-1.11 
-0.000009 
-1.24 
-0.000008 
-3.58*** 
-0.000008 
-0.52 
-0.00002 
-5.34*** 
Debt to Assets -0.3654 
-2.43** 
-0.0574 
-2.34** 
-0.1155 
-16*** 
-0.3533 
-7.10*** 
0.0007 
0.06 
Free Cash Flow 0.0003 
0.26 
0.0005 
2.60*** 
0.0002 
2.63*** 
-0.000001 
-0.00 
-0.0006 
-5.75*** 
ROA -2.463 
-4.72*** 
  -1.7098 
-14.90*** 
0.1565 
5.43*** 
Payout -0.0158 
-3.33*** 
0.00004 
0.07 
0.00002 
0.12 
0.0006 
0.42 
-0.00002 
-0.06 
Sales Growth 1.393 
14.35*** 
-0.0527 
-6.61*** 
-0.0384 
-14.90*** 
 0.0129 
2.98*** 
Inside Ownership -0.1173 
-0.55 
0.1005 
2.84*** 
0.0344 
3.02*** 
0.3768 
4.97*** 
-0.4046 
-23.62*** 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.1115 
-0.53 
0.1629 
4.78*** 
0.0590 
5.43*** 
0.2169 
2.98*** 
 
Founder -5.616 
-0.39 
4.3231 
1.86* 
0.8293 
1.11 
47.27 
9.59*** 
-0.9709 
-0.80 
Total Compensation -0.00008 
-0.78 
0.00004 
2.16* 
0.00002 
4.20*** 
0.00007 
1.89* 
-0.000008 
-0.79 
Years as CEO -0.1328 
-0.25 
-0.1674 
-1.91* 
-0.02063 
-0.72 
-0.5988 
-3.15*** 
0.2404 
5.21*** 
Years with 
Company 
-0.5934 
-1.94* 
0.1255 
2.45** 
0.05237 
3.18*** 
-0.4612 
-4.19*** 
-0.2612 
-9.86*** 
Year -3.764 
-3.11*** 
0.3077 
1.50 
0.1905 
2.89*** 
-1.8242 
-4.15*** 
0.0184 
0.17 
AACSB 13.633 
1.51 
0.94922 
0.64 
0.7793 
1.63 
3.520 
1.10 
-2.2873 
-2.93*** 
R2 0.1066 0.0337 0.1606 0.1337 0.2211 
ADJ R2 0.1013 0.0288 0.1563 0.1293 0.2171 
F-Statistic 20.06*** 6.88*** 37.82*** 30.50*** 56.11*** 
This table shows the regression results for the equation:                                                       .  The 
first figure in each cell is the parameter estimate.  The second figure in each cell is the t-statistic.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
The third column shows the regression results when Return on Assets, ROA, is the dependent variable.  The 
stepwise procedure introduces eleven variables into the model.  Gender has a coefficient of 5.87 and is significant at 
the one percent level.  Like the ROI regressions above, CEO Compensation and Years with the company are 
positive and significant.  The R2 for this regression is 0.1596. 
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The next column shows the results of regression on Sales Growth.  Eleven variables are included in the 
final regression.  Gender has a coefficient of 25.84 and is significant at the one percent level.  This finding indicates 
that female CEO’s produce higher sales growth than their male counterparts.  The founder variable is positive and 
significant indicating that firms with a CEO who founded the firm produce more sales growth than other CEO’s.  
The R2 for this regression is 0.1326. 
 
The final column in Table 4 shows the results of regressions on Institutional Ownership.  Ten variables 
entered into the model with nine significant at the one percent level.  Gender, was significant only at the ten percent 
level in this regression.  The positive coefficient (4.11) for the gender variable indicates that institutions own more 
stock of firms with a female CEO than a male CEO.  The R2 for the regression is 0.2199, the highest R2 for any 
regression in this analysis. 
 
Table 4:  Stepwise Regression Analysis 
Variable Price to Earnings ROI ROA Sales Growth 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Observations 2,876 3,166 3,179 3,179 3,179 
Intercept 7,880.64 -3.7296 -378.77231 3753.502 96.68853 
Gender 163.52 
38.67*** 
17.30054 
15.21*** 
5.87313 
16.57*** 
25.83547 
7.27*** 
4.10894 
3.08* 
GICS   -0.02838 
3.82* 
 -0.32346 
198.89*** 
Price to Book 0.0858 
4.00** 
0.0137 
3.33* 
 0.0645 
15.85*** 
 
Total Assets   -0.000008 
13.03*** 
 -0.00002 
29.08*** 
Debt to Assets -0.3781 
6.48** 
-0.0588 
5.81** 
-0.1153 
254.90*** 
-0.3570 
52.41*** 
 
Free Cash Flow  0.0005 
6.37** 
0.0002 
6.56*** 
 -0.0006 
33.89*** 
ROA -2.5170 
25.54*** 
  -1.711 
224.27*** 
0.1511 
30.19*** 
Payout -0.1585 
11.29*** 
    
Sales Growth 1.3760 
208.93*** 
-0.0518 
43.96*** 
-0.0379 
223.43*** 
 0.0117 
7.78*** 
Inside Ownership  0.0965 
8.01*** 
0.0322 
8.44*** 
0.3581 
23.09*** 
-0.4055 
561.80*** 
Institutional 
Ownership 
 0.1654 
25.65*** 
0.0578 
28.62*** 
0.1923 
7.61*** 
 
 
Founder    47.3905 
94.28*** 
 
Total Compensation  0.00004 
4.43** 
0.00002 
17.72*** 
0.00007 
3.38* 
 
Years as CEO    -0.5829 
9.46*** 
0.2214 
30.26*** 
Years with 
Company 
-0.7074 
7.08*** 
0.0859 
3.67** 
0.0490 
11.04*** 
-0.4951 
21.16*** 
-0.2563 
94.87*** 
Year -3.9146 
10.73*** 
 0.19130 
8.47*** 
-1.86050 
18.13*** 
 
AACSB 14.7538 
2.74* 
   -2.027 
6.95*** 
R2 0.1052 0.031 0.1596 0.1326 0.2199 
F-Statistic 37.44*** 11.22*** 46.47*** 44.04 99.30*** 
This table shows the stepwise regression results for the equation:                                                      
 .  Variables with a p-value less than 0.20 were allowed to enter into the model.  To remain in the model the p-value for the variable 
must be below 0.10.  The first figure in each cell is the parameter estimate.  The second figure in each cell is the F-value.  ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Newly available data allows us to examine how CEO gender impacts various firm performance measures 
and management variables of the largest U.S. firms.  We collect data from Forbes magazine and Compustat 
including 6,305 firm year observations covering the time period 1997-2006.  The analysis examines the relationships 
in three ways.  First, we conduct single regressions using gender as the explanatory variable in each regression.  The 
results show that gender has significant explanatory power for four of fourteen dependent variables considered:  
Return on Investment, Price to Earnings Ratio, Debt to Assets and Industry. 
 
Next, we conduct multiple regressions that include Gender as an explanatory variable and a series of 
control variables.  The results show that Gender significantly explains five dependent variables after accounting for 
the effects of the control variables.  Gender significantly explains variation in Price to Earnings, Return on 
Investment, Return on Assets, Sales Growth and Institutional Ownership. 
 
Finally, we use Stepwise regression to include only those explanatory variables that are significant in 
explaining dependent variable variance.  The results include between nine and eleven variables in the regression 
models.  In each case, Gender is a significant explanatory variable.  The R2 statistics for the regressions range in 
value from 0.031 to 0.2199. 
 
The results presented here clearly indicate that female CEO’s manage their firms differently and are 
perceived differently by financial markets.  In general, female CEO’s produce higher sales growth, more 
institutional ownership, provide higher returns in the form of ROI and ROA and are valued higher in the market than 
firms managed by male CEO’s.  The results presented here are exploratory in nature.  The number of female CEO’s 
is relatively low with only 77 firm year observations out of 6,305 involving a female CEO.  In the future, as more 
females become CEO’s of large public firms, additional analysis will become possible.   
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